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The Security and Human Rights Dilemma:  






In the post-1991 U.S.-Ethiopian diplomacy, the use of foreign policy as a framework to 
advance the cause of human rights has faced several challenges rooted in the way human rights is 
defined and the intricate interests vested in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. This article 
elucidates the limitations and challenges of diplomatic machinery as a framework for advancing 
the cause of human rights. First, human rights in the U.S. foreign policy machine have been 
given a marginal or subordinate place in diplomatic priorities. Second, the Government of 
Ethiopia’s (GOE) resistance and tough diplomatic measures and Ethiopia’s strategic importance 
to the U.S. have alienated or narrowed the space for active human rights diplomacy in Ethiopia, 
making it a highly politicized undertaking rife with claims and counterclaims of sovereignty, 
national interest, power politics, and manipulation. However, effective advancement of human 
rights using the foreign policy framework is limited not only to the choice of U.S. foreign policy 
makers/diplomats, but also equally important is the domestic political context. Finally, this 
article will show how GOE has evaded active human rights diplomacy, but done so in a way that 
serves the overall U.S. strategic foreign policy.  
 
A.   The Emergence of Human Rights in U.S. – Ethiopia Relations 
 
Human rights concerns became an integral part of U.S. foreign policy objectives during 
the Carter administration.1 The Carter administration pledged to restrict aid to military regimes 
that engaged in gross human rights violations.2 According to David Shinn, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Ethiopia, the “terrible human rights record” of the Derg military regime in 
Ethiopia became an impediment to the bilateral relationship until the revolution of 1991.3 
The end of the Derg period marked the revival of Ethiopia-U.S. relations, which have 
subsequently been strengthened. The U.S. had a renewed interest in the region, and the Ethiopian 
government needed diplomatic, political, and economic assistance. After 1991, the new regime 
declared a democratic style of governance, adopted a constitution that enshrined fundamental 
human rights and promised free, fair, and periodic elections.4 The Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia (TGE) declared its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sandy Vogelgesang, Diplomacy of Human Rights, 23 INT’L STUD. Q. 216, 224-25 (1979).  
2 Edmond Keller and Ruth Iyob, U.S. Policy in the Horn: Grappling with a Difficult Legacy, in EAST AFRICA AND 
THE HORN: CONFRONTING CHALLENGES TO GOOD GOVERNANCE 101, 105 (Dorina A. Bekoe ed., 2006).   
3 Interview with David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador in Ethiopia from 1996 until 1999. (Dec. 22, 2010 – Dec. 24, 
2010) (He is currently an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University.)..  
4 Interview with Dr. Solomon Mebere, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Oct. 11, 2010).  




(UDHR), pledging to respect individual and human rights, to bring an end to civil war, and to 
transfer power to an elected federal and regional government.5 
In the following years, the U.S. branded the leaders of this new government the “Young 
Democratic Leaders,” and proclaimed Ethiopia a “frontline state”6 in the fight against Islamic 
fundamentalism in the region, and a “key strategic partner” in the post-9/11 “war on terror.”7 
B.   Ethiopia’s Strategic Importance to the U.S. 
Despite being one of the world’s poorest nations and a landlocked state, Ethiopia has 
been said to have many “selling points” that make it an attractive partner for the U.S.8 
Geographically, as a large country that borders all the other countries in the Horn of Africa, 
Ethiopia contributes to the stability—or instability—of the entire region.9 As an anchor state, 
Ethiopia commands great influence, either negatively or positively.10 
The Horn of Africa’s deteriorating security dynamic has made Ethiopia’s relative 
strength central to the stability of the region where,11 as one commentator notes, “Somalia is a 
dangerously failed state, the Sudan and Eritrea are pariahs, and Kenya has troubles of its own.”12 
Besides this, external factors have added to Ethiopia’s significance in terms of U.S. interests in 
the region. Sudan and Somalia were accused of harboring transnational terrorist groups and 
hosting training camps that produced terrorist operations like the attempted assassination of 
Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995.13 Following the bombing in Nairobi, the biggest 
al-Qaeda cell in the region at the time was allegedly found in Sudan, with the Sudan government 
accused of providing the group with financial support.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 THEODORE M. VESTAL, ETHIOPIA: A POST-COLD WAR AFRICAN STATE 8 (1999).  
6 Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda were part of the “frontline states” in an effort that was underway during the Clinton 
administration. It began in 1995 to put pressure on Sudan for policy or even regime change. ROBERT P. SKINNER, 
THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION TO ETHIOPIA AND A CENTURY OF AMERICA–ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS 68, 69 (Yalemzewd 
Worku ed., 2003); See also,Dan Connell, Eritrea: On a Slow Fuse, in BATTLING TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF 
AFRICA 70 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2005).  
7 ROBERT P. SKINNER, THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION TO ETHIOPIA AND A CENTURY OF AMERICA–ETHIOPIAN 
RELATIONS 68, 69 (Yalemzewd Worku ed., 2003).  
8 Ethiopian and the United States: A loveless liaison, THE ECONOMIST (April 3, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/10979876.   
9 Shinn, supra note 3. 
10 Id. 
11 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011). 
12 Ethiopian and the United States: A loveless liaison, supra note 8. 
13 The bombings claimed the lives of hundreds of Kenyans, Tanzanians, and a handful of U.S. citizens. See David H. 
Shinn, Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn, 27 J. CONFLICT STUD. (2007); See also Chau Donovan C, Political 
Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South 
Africa 4 (2006);Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Sudan act to extradite suspects in 
assassination attempt of Egyptian President by 10 May, or Face limited sanctions, U.N. Press Release SC/6214 
(April 26, 1996). 
14 Jessica R. Piombo, Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview,  (Jan. 2007),  
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/index.html (according to Jessica R. Piombo, 
the groups from Somalia and Eritrea were formally associated with Islamic Army Shura having link with groups in 
Uganda and West African states. The U.S. interest in the region —especially on counterterrorism efforts—have 
increased because the Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) government, Hassan al Turabi, used to have links with 
Osama bin Laden and the various Al-Qaeda links and presence in East Africa.). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [2018 
 67 
Ethiopia also has a strong military tradition and institutions that make it a dependable 
security partner.15 From its strategic geographical location, Ethiopia can serve as an important 
base for military operations to collect intelligence information and conduct security operations 
throughout the region, and the U.S. is likely very much aware of the solid military and security 
cooperation Ethiopia can deliver. As a result, the U.S. has no alternative but to cooperate with 
the Ethiopian government to ensure peace and stability in the region.16 
In terms of political leverage, Ethiopia has built a highly respectable position both 
continentally and internationally from which U.S. policy makers can draw support to “buttress 
their security interest not only regionally, but also globally.”17 Addis Ababa is the headquarters 
for the African Union, which means Ethiopia can play a significant role in influencing other 
states’ policies. According to Siaye Abraha, any country that wants to influence African policy 
should appoint a senior diplomat in Addis Ababa and maintain good relations with the GOE.18 
C.   The U.S. and Ethiopia’s Intersecting Security Concerns 
Ethiopia has historical security concerns revolving around separatist groups in Ogaden 
fueled by irredentist claims from Somalia, like al Itihaad al Islamiya in the 1990s.19 This 
transnational security threat stretches from Ogaden to mainland Somalia.20 Particularly after war 
broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998, the threat of a proxy war through Islamic forces 
with irredentist claims increased. According to Terrence Lyons, “Ethiopia is embedded within a 
network of conflicts that links Somalia, Ogaden, and Eritrea.”21 More significantly, Al-Ittihad 
Al-Islamiya’s goal of creating an Islamic state with an Ethiopian-Somali population is a direct 
threat to the national security of Ethiopia and the U.S. concern for regional stability.22 For 
instance, in 1997, it was reported that, during a military operation in Somalia, some dead 
Afghans and Arabs were found with Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya fighters.23 The U.S. has been fighting 
to prevent—or counteract—Somalia’s use as a breeding ground for terrorists and a base for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview with Dr. Okobazgi, Professor,Political Science Department of University of Louisville, (Dec. 22, 2010-
Jan. 24, 2010). Okobazgi argues that, for over a century, Ethiopia has earned a highly respectable position both at 
home and abroad, allowing American policy makers to draw on Ethiopian support to buttress their security interest 
not only regionally, but also globally. 
16 Ethiopia’s strategic importance to U.S. security interests in the region is described as having no parallel in the 
region. Ethiopia occupies a very important geo-strategic location in the Horn of Africa, which serves both as a 
gateway into Black Africa and a monitoring station of the Middle East. Okobazgi, supra note 15. 
17 Id.More importantly, Ethiopia’s strategic significance to the U.S. and the west security interest in the region is 
hailed by senior senators and generals. For instance, General Ward commanders of the U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and U.S. Joint Force Command said: “Ethiopia remains 
a friend, a partner in our efforts to help produce stability in the region.” Senior U.S. Senators and Gen Ward 
recognizes Ethiopia as the main stabilizing force in the Horn region, available at 
http://www.aigaforum.com/news/Senior_US_Senators_and_Gen_Ward 
18 Interview with Siaye Abraha, Former FDRE Ministry of Defense, in Addis Ababa (Dec. 8,2010).  
19 Bronwyn E. Bruton, Ethiopia, Somalia, international peace and security; U.S. policy shift needed in the horn of 
Africa, Council on Foreign relations 1-3 (Aug. 2009). See also John Prendergast and Colin Thomas –Jensen, 
Blowing the Horn, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2007), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-africa/2007-03-
01/blowing-horn.   
20 Kirubel Tadesse, Ruling Party sees in ONLF an image of itself: US Embassy Cables, KIRUBEL’S BLOG (Feb. 18, 
2011), https://kirubel.wordpress.com/2011/02/18/ruling-party-sees-in-onlf-an-image-of-itself-us-embassy-cables/. 
21 Terrence Lyons, Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crisis, Current History (2008) at 159. 
22 David Shinn, Ethiopia: Governance and Terrorism, in BATTLING TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 93, 101 
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2005). 
23 Ted Dagne, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31247, AFRICA AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2002). 




transnational terrorism operations and other transnational jihadist groups.24 Consequently, the 
threat of international terrorism has become a common cause for Ethiopia and the United States, 
signifying the important role Ethiopia can play in the region.25 
In order to ensure stability and security as well as fight terrorism, the U.S. has tried to 
strengthen security cooperation with Ethiopia. During the Clinton administration, Ethiopia was 
among the “frontline states” sponsored by the U.S. The U.S. organized Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Uganda to force Sudan “either to bring policy or regime change”26 to counter Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Horn.27 After the Ethio-Eritrea war, Eritrea’s relations with the U.S. 
soured28 leaving Ethiopia as the U.S.’ most significant ally in this effort. 
The U.S.’s 2002 National Security strategy stated that “America is now less threatened 
by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”29 U.S. strategic calculation aimed to bar access 
to the region for al-Qaeda and its operatives from the Arabian Peninsula, in view of the fact that 
Somalia was a failed state and could not control its own territory.30 
The U.S. has significantly increased military aid to Africa and conducted a large number 
of joint military operations on the continent since 9/11.31 More significantly, a regional joint 
force with a U.S. military base with more than 2000 military personnel was launched in Djibouti 
in 2002.32 The U.S. military base in the Horn and  the Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti 
(CJTF-HOA) is meant to fight and defeat the international terrorist groups that pose a threat to 
the U.S. and its allies, including Ethiopia.33 Consecutive high delegation visits in Washington 
and Addis Ababa in 200234 marked the strengthening of cooperation and the security partnership 
between Ethiopia and the U.S. in the fight against terrorism. As a result, Ethiopia became a 
beneficiary of the $100 million aid program that was designed to boost the military capacity of 
the states in the Horn to fight terrorism.35 
According to Major General John F. Sattler, Commander of CJTF-HOA, Ethiopia is a 
“valued partner in our mission to detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorists who pose an imminent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bronwyn Bruton, U.S. Policy Shift Needed in the Horn of Africa, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 6, 
2009).     
25 Robert Berschinski, AFRICOM’S Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Building,” 
Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa at 45-47, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (Nov. 
2007), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=827. 
26 Theodore Vesal, ETHIOPIA: A POST-COLD WAR AFRICAN STATE, 195-96 (Greenwood, 1999).  
27 Id. 
28 Interview with Siaye Abraha, Former FDRE Ministry of Defense (Dec. 8,2010) in Addis Ababa (on file with 
author). 
29 The White House, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
30 Brennan Kraxberger, The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an “Age of Terror”, 52 AFRICA 
TODAY 47, 48 (2005). See also Martin Plaut, The U.S. fails to break Somali Islamist, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7807291.stm, stating that it has been The U.S. security priority in the region is 
mainly focused on the nexus between failed states and terrorism. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 58. 
33 ROBERT P. SKINNER, THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION TO ETHIOPIA AND A CENTURY OF AMERICA–ETHIOPIAN 
RELATIONS 72 (Yalemzewd Worku ed., 2003). See also David Shinn, Ethiopia: Governance and Terrorism, supra 
note 119.  
34 Id. 
35 ROBERT P. SKINNER, THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION TO ETHIOPIA AND A CENTURY OF AMERICA–ETHIOPIAN 
RELATIONS 69 (Yalemzewd Worku ed., 2003), supra note 33. 
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threat to our coalition partners in the Horn of Africa.”36 Analysts argue that the U.S. 
counterterrorism policy has extended “unconditional support to the Ethiopian government.”37 
Increases in U.S. military aid to Ethiopia reflect this support. For instance, according to the 
World Factbook, between 1999 and 2001, U.S. military aid to Ethiopia totaled just $928,000 
USD, which translated to a rank of 110th among states that receive U.S. military aid.38 Three 
years later, post-9/11, military aid increased to $16.8 million USD and Ethiopia ranked 66th.39 
This is a clear indication that security cooperation between the two countries has increased and 
strengthened since 9/11.40 
The Islamic Courts Union (IUC) in Somalia further deepened the security threat to the 
Ethiopian government by broadening its power base in central and southern Somalia,41 and later 
claiming the Ogaden Somalia region of Ethiopia.42 The group’s hardliner members gained the 
upper hand and declared a holy war against Ethiopia, which was then used as a justification for 
Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia in 2006, when Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to 
assist Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).43 The Ethiopian military managed to 
defeat IUC forces, but many of Somalia’s Islamists scattered, engaging in a vicious insurgency 
against the Ethiopian-backed TFG. 
The senior U.S. envoy to Africa, Jendayi Frazer, publicly said that the IUC was 
controlled by members of al-Qaeda: “The top layers of the Courts are extremists. They are 
terrorists.”44 There were reports of U.S. military air strikes and oft-mentioned intelligence and 
military cooperation with the Ethiopian military in Somalia.45 It has also been documented that 
U.S. forces trained elements of the Ethiopian military, supported the invasion with intelligence 
information, and carried out air strikes on suspected al-Qaeda targets.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Erich Marquardt, Al-Queda’s Threat to Ethiopia, THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Feb. 9, 2005), 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27524&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1
80&no_cache=1#.VP0zFEJ-ybB. 
37 John Prendergast and Colin Thomas, Blowing in the Horn, 86 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 59, 65 (2007). 
38 Marina Guevara, Ethiopia Reaps U.S. Aid by Enlisting in War on Terror and Hiring Influential Lobbyists, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (May 22, 2007), 
www.icij.org/projects/collateraldamage/ethiopia-reaps-us-aid-enlisting-war-terror-and-hiring-influential.  
39 Id. 
40 ROBERT P. SKINNER, THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION, supra note 130, at 75 (stating that in order to see the U.S. 
increasing military aid to Ethiopia it is interesting to note the 2001 and the proceeding years. In 2001 there was no 
U.S. military grant and/or loan, no U.S. military education and training program in Ethiopia. But interestingly 
enough, in 2002 U.S. authorized $250,000 in low interest loan and reached $750,000 in 2003. And commercial sales 
reached 285,000 in the same year.). 
41 Solomon Dersso, Somalia Dilemmas: Changing Security Dynamics, but Limited Policy Choices, Institute for 
Security Studies 5 (Oct. 2010).  
42 Mohammed Adow, Ogaden Draws in Tension Once More, BBC FOCUS ON AFRICA (Oct. 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5383012.stm.  
43 Martin Plaut, U.S. Fails to Break Somali Islamists, BBC NEWS (Jan. 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/default.stm). 
44 See id.  
45 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign relations, AL Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, 
A Report Committee on Foreign relation. 111th Cong., 2nd sess., January 21, 2010 (Washington,GPO, 2010), 37-39, 
accessed on http://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_rpt/sfrc-aq.pdf 21-22 
46 Robert G. Berschinski, AFRICOM’S Dilemma: The Global war on Terrorism, Capacity building, 
Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 42 (Nov. 2007), 
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/. Similarly, there were also reports in The New York Times in April 
that the U.S. allowed the GOE to purchased arms from North Korea despite the UN sanction on N. Korea. The 
report states that the U.S. has let the GOE to purchase arms from N. Korea to strengthen the GOE military offensive 




Ethiopian troops have been crucial in helping the TFG maintain power in the face of an 
offensive by Al-Shabab, especially after the Eritrean government was accused of supporting Al-
Shabab.47 Ethiopia’s status as an important ally to the U.S. increased further after the U.S. 
recognized the TFG as a legitimate government and branded Al-Shababa a terrorist 
organization.48 This unified Ethiopia and the U.S. in their support of the TFG and their shared 
interest in keeping the country intact and the region stable. 
It is evident that Ethiopia and the U.S. government were working very closely on the 
Somalia war to fight terrorist organizations operating in the region. For instance, Vicki 
Huddleston,49 Chargé d’affaires at the U.S Embassy in Ethiopia at the time of the war, urged the 
opposition parties in Ethiopia to support the GOE war in Somalia,50 and there was a strong 
argument from the GOE that the IUC posed an imminent and serious threat to the national 
security and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. 
U.S. officials remain deeply concerned with the overall security situation in the Horn, 
particularly the increase in insurgency and trans-boundary terrorist attacks.51 This is especially 
true since the attack in Kampala, Uganda, on 11 July 2010, and reports of the mushrooming Al-
Qaeda operation in Yemen,52 which indicated that Al Shabab was becoming a growing threat as 
a “global jihadist movement” beyond the borders of Somalia.53 For better or for worse, U.S. 
policy makers see Ethiopia as a “bulwark of stability” in the region.54 
 
II.   UNITED STATES AND GOE DIALOGUE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
A.   U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy in Ethiopia 
 
The language of human rights has become common parlance for Western diplomats, and 
it is used as a means of negotiation and diplomatic communication.55 Concerns about alleged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
against the Islamist Militias’ in Somalia. See Roger Middleton, Ethiopia's Somalia Dilemma (Dec., 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/default.stm. 
47Al-Shabab was said to be the military wing of UIC until the defeat UIC in 2007 by TFG and Ethiopian military 
operation. As a result Al-Shabab emerged as a separate military insurgency force against TFG and the Ethiopia 
forces. Solomon Dersso, Somalia Dilemmas: Changing Security Dynamics, but Limited Policy Choices, Institute for 
Security Studies 5 (Oct. 2010). 
48 Id. 
49 Huddleston is a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (2009-2011) and Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim in Ethiopia (2005-2006).  
50 Interview with Dr. Yacob Hailemariam, retired Professor of Bus. Law, Norfolk State Univ., in Addis Ababa, Eth. 
(Feb. 21, 2011) (notes in Amharic and on file with author); Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina, Leader of the Oromo 
People’s Cong., in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Feb. 9, 2011) (notes in Amharic and on file with author). Dr. Yacob said: 
“she [Vicki Huddleston] was actively advocating for the support of the GOE’s military operation in 
Somalia,”despite the opposition parties in the parliament voting against the war.  
51 Solomon Dersso, Somalia Dilemmas: Changing Security Dynamics, but Limited Policy Choices, 218 Institute for 
Security Studies 14 (2010). 
52 Interview with K-4 (Sept. 9, 2010) (on file with author).  
53 Id.; supra note 147 (Solomon in his article also argues that Al-Shabab is becoming an increasing threat as it is 
transforming a largely nationalist insurgency into a global jihadist movement). 
54 Interview with Terrence Lyons, Assoc. Professor, George Mason Univ., in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Jan. 22, 2011) (on 
file with author).  
55 Interview with Dr. Solomon Mebere, in Addis Ababa, Eth. (Oct. 11, 2010) (notes in Amharic and on file with 
author); JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 9 (2d ed. 2008); See also 
CLAIR APODACA, UNDERSTANDING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY: A PARADOXICAL LEGACY 179, 195 (2006). 
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violations are communicated through diplomatic channels via reports, press releases, embassy 
communiqués, and delegations that employ either public or quiet diplomacy. It is now difficult to 
think of Western diplomacy without its language of democracy and human rights. This is partly 
because individual liberty and freedom are part of the U.S. legal and political tradition, but it is 
also because this lingua franca is an important diplomatic tool for negotiations.56 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, describes the human rights agenda as 
the most “contentious dialogue” in U.S.-Ethiopia relations.57 The U.S. State Department’s annual 
Human Rights Report are said to have caused “considerable consternation in Addis Ababa”58 
since the U.S. re-engaged with the Ethiopian government during the early period of the TGE. 
This pejorative point of view was amplified by the U.S. ambassador’s critical interviews with the 
opposition press in the 1990s.59 For instance, during Secretary of State Warner Christopher’s 
visit to Addis Ababa in 1996, he expressed concern and unhappiness over the arrest of journalists 
and restriction of press freedom.60 The U.S. also expressed interest in expanding the political 
space for free and fair political contests and ending political arrests throughout the 1990s.61 
Since this time, the U.S. has been using the language of human rights to deal with the 
GOE, driven by the policy rationale of establishing a stable, viable, democratic country—
friendly to the U.S.—in the Horn of Africa. The U.S. has persistently expressed concern over 
human rights abuses and the progress of democratization. As Shinn describes, “the U.S. 
understood that this takes time but regularly expressed its impatience.”62 U.S. human rights and 
democracy goals in Ethiopia include “lowering of political and ethnic tension, improving human 
rights, broadening representation and participation in Parliament, boosting the credibility and 
capacity of the National Election Board and increasing access to the media and the quality of 
public information.”63 
1.   The Annual State Department Report 
 
The annual State Department Human Rights Reports for Ethiopia between 1994 and 2010 
indicate human rights abuses in a variety of categories. The category with the highest number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Important discussion has been made in Bait and Switch, and, according to Julie A. Mertus, universal human rights is 
the language of the day for the many diplomats, Pentagon spokesmen, and U.S. state department employees’ and 
other government officials’ public pronouncements. 
56 See DAVID P. FORSYTHE,  HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 160 (2d ed. 2006 (arguing that human 
rights are squarely equated with “personal freedoms” as it is found in the U.S. Bill of Rights, lacking the complex 
conception of human rights in international instruments.  see also  Interview with Dr. Solomon Mebere, in Addis 
Ababa, Eth. (Oct. 11, 2010) (notes in Amharic and on file with author); ; see also similar discussion regarding  the 
sidelining of ESCRs in the U.S. in JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
230 (2d ed. 2008). 
57 ROBERT P. SKINNER, THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION TO ETHIOPIA AND A CENTURY OF AMERICA–ETHIOPIAN 
RELATIONS 68 (Yalemzewd Worku ed., 2003).  
58 Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS (the 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are submitted annually by the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. 
Congress in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as 
amended, and section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended).  
59 ROBERT P. SKINNER, THE 1903 SKINNER MISSION TO ETHIOPIA AND A CENTURY OF AMERICA–ETHIOPIAN 
RELATIONS 68(Yalemzewd Worku ed., 2003).  
60 Id.  
61 Theodore M. Vestal, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State 196-97 (1999). 
62 Id. at 67. 
63 U.S.Dep’t of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2005-2006, Publication 11333, 
26 (2000). 




reported incidents is “Respect for the Integrity of the Person and Freedom,” including: “Arbitrary 
or Unlawful Deprivation of Life; Disappearance; Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Arbitrary Arrest or Detention; Denial of Fair Public Trial; 
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence.”64 The other category, 
“Respect for Civil Liberties,” includes: Freedom of Speech and Press; Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and Association; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Religion; and violation of 
“Elections and Political Participation” rights.65 Despite the predominance of violations like 
intimidation, alleged political killings, and mistreatment of detainees, the language of human 
rights in U.S.–Ethiopia relations is more or less reduced to a discussion of civil and political 
rights focusing on individual freedoms.66 
The public release of the annual report is part of the public diplomacy that the U.S. 
conducts to advance the human rights agenda with Ethiopia. Recently, following the 
establishment of the Communication Affairs Office, the GOE has started responding to this 
public release.67 The government has reacted strongly, objecting to the report’s findings as 
“inaccurate and lacking objectivity.”68 As a result, the human rights agenda has become one of 
the most controversial issues in U.S.-Ethiopia diplomatic relations, and the annual human rights 
report has been described as “an inevitable source and annual irritant in the otherwise excellent 
relations between the US and Ethiopia.”69 
According to the preface to the 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, it is 
clearly stated by Secretary of State John F. Kerry that the U.S. government considers the annual 
report an important diplomatic engagement.70 However, the report is also subjected to political 
maneuvering and negotiations. Some interest groups—including, perhaps most prominently, 
Human Rights First71—have criticized the State Department for taking politics into account 
while drafting the final report. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in the 
reports’ introductions, overall human rights conditions are frequently termed “better” regardless 
of the objective facts, and especially if the country is deemed friendly or strategically important 
to the U.S.72 The country reports for Ethiopia are criticized for their selective reporting and 
carefully crafted phrases, which are of “dubious authenticity” in describing the human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 U.S. Dep’t of State., Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia 
(1994-2010) (looking at the reports between the period 1994-2010, violation against the Respect for the Integrity of 
the Person and Freedom is presented as the most prevalent violation).  
65 Id.  
66 JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 28 (2d ed. 2008). See also 
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 169-170, 184 (2d ed. 2006).  
67 Interview with K-1 Senior Official, FDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 15, 2011) (on file with author). 
68 Id. (My informant stated that the government has made an official response after conducting field researches and 
other important investigations on the alleged violations.)  
69 Press Release, FDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Ethiopia: 
Not Honorable or Accurate (Mar. 4, 2008). 
70  Press Release, John Kerry, Secretary of State Remarks on the Release of the Human Rights Report (April 19, 
2013). Available on:  https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207791.htm 
71 Formerly known as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 
72 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Holding the Line, A Critique of the Department of State’s Annual Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, 4 (2003). 
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situation.73 The objectives seem at least somewhat political, and the report paves the way for the 
U.S.’s extended assistance to Ethiopia and strengthens U.S. strategic ties.  
The U.S. Department of State has also been criticized for depicting the GOE in the most 
favorable light possible through its reports.74 According to Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus 
of Political Science at Oklahoma State University, “for eight years after the Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991, the annual human rights 
report conveyed the impression that the Ethiopian government was committed to improving 
human rights and to the democratization process.”75 The Lawyers’ Committee maintains that 
human rights abuses by state were frequently “understated, simplified or unreported, or used in a 
manner that implies the context of the abuse.”76 The drafters of the report have been criticized 
for attaching justifications such as “combating terrorism” or “insurgency,” which are meant to 
“diminish state responsibility in a way that gives leeway.”77 
This is particularly true for the human rights reports of 2005 and 2009.78 The 2005 report, 
for instance, revealed the fact that the GOE forces had been conducting “low level” operations 
against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Somalia-based Al Ittihad Al Islamiya 
terrorist organization, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).79 In the same paragraph, the report 
states that there were “some instances in which elements of the security forces acted 
independently of government authority and members of the security forces committed serious 
human rights abuses.”80 
The 2009 human rights report discloses similar allegations of human rights violations 
because of the conflict between the ONLF81 and government forces, including local militias.82 
The report qualifies its criticism, suggesting that “despite the general effective control of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Press Release, Oromia Support Group, Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia, (Jan.-Feb. 1998); see also  U.S. Dep’t 
of State., Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, 17-
20 (1998) for a description of the human rights situation in Ethiopia.  
74 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011) (Vestal similarly argues that the atrocious prison conditions, the regularity of detention in 
unofficial centers, and the brutality experienced by detainees in these centers was similarly glossed over in the 
Reports from 1991-1998. And argue that the U.S. Department of State's 1999 through 2009 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices in Ethiopia are far more candid accounts of human rights abuses than were their 
predecessors. The 1999 report stated that “the Government's human rights record generally was poor.” The 2000-
2005 reports admitted that “the Government's human rights record remained poor.” In the 2006-2009 reports, the 
lengthy rehearsing of human rights abuses makes such a soft reproach redundant and unnecessary. 
75 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011) (similar information has also been drawn from interviews with Dr. Terrence Lyons (Jan. 21, 
2011); Dr. Yacob (Feb. 21, 2011) (notes in Amharic and on file with author); and Dr. Merera Gudina (Feb. 9, 2011) 
(notes in Amharic and on file with author).  
76 Holding the Line, A Critique of the Department of State’s Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 10 
[emphasis added]. 
77 Id. 
78 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
ETHIOPIA (2005), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.; BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES: ETHIOPIA (2009) (emphasis added), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm.  
81 Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is an ethnically based, nationalist, insurgent movement operating in the 
eastern part of Ethiopia. Political Background of the Ogadenia Struggle, OGADEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, 
http://onlf.org/?page_id=12.  
82 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
ETHIOPIA (2006), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm.  




security forces, there were numerous instances in which elements within those forces acted 
independently of government authority.”83 The fact that state security forces act independently 
without direct government agency order does not necessarily exempt the government from 
responsibility for human rights violations committed. The government should both guarantee the 
security of the people living in its territory and hold perpetrators of human rights abuses 
accountable. Therefore, according to Vestal, the report is only a soft reproach, and more to the 
point are the findings that “some local officials and members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.”84 
The State Department’s guideline requirement that “[a]ctions by governments taken at 
the request of the United States or with the express support of the United States should not be 
included in the report”85 is an attempt to formalize U.S. policy with respect to the reporting of 
human rights practices, which includes the sanctioned concealment of certain abuses due to 
political considerations. Even though this requirement was dropped in the 2003 report, the 
Lawyers’ Committee argues that political pressure from the host country’s U.S. embassy or 
Washington remains an issue.86 Here, it is worth noting that a report’s initial draft is prepared by 
the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa then sent to Washington for review.87 The U.S. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, in cooperation with other State Department bureaus and 
offices and federal departments and agencies, takes part in the preparation of the final report.88 
Throughout this process, the report is assessed in the context of various political considerations, 
and altered through diplomatic maneuvering and negotiations.89  
 
2.   Other Aspects of U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy in Ethiopia 
 
In addition to the State Department’s annual human rights report, the U.S. also employs 
other tools to conduct diplomacy related to human rights. For example, U.S. embassy officials, 
most importantly the Ambassador, reach out to GOE authorities, opposition leaders, NGOs and 
other stakeholders.90 An official document91 from the State Department also reveals that U.S. 
officials frequently meet with opposition leaders concerning allegations of torture, harassment, 
and illegal detention of their members and supporters.92 The Ambassador has also been active in 
engaging with the National Election Board and government officials in public and in private.93 
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84 Interview with Theodore M. Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES: ETHIOPIA (2006), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm. 
85 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Holding the Line, A Critique of the Department of State’s Annual Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices (2003), www.Ichr.orgpage.iii.   
86 Id. at iv. 
87 Confidential Interview with K-4 (Sept. 9, 2010) (on file with author). 
88 United States Department of States, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2005-2006, 
Department of State Publication 11333, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Bureau of Public Affairs 
(April 2000), Sec1:IV. 
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91 United States Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2005-2006 
(2005-2006), ii.   
92 Id. at 28. 
93 Id. at 27. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [2018 
 75 
The Ambassador, accompanied by officials from other foreign embassies, has met regularly with 
the Prime Minister regarding human rights abuses alleged by the opposition and concerns about 
democracy.94 
U.S. embassy officials and appointed ambassadors often made overtures both in private 
conversation and through public diplomacy concerning human rights issues in Ethiopia.95 After 
the 2005 election, in particular, there were behind-the-scenes discussions and a series of 
dialogues about release of “political prisoners”96 as well as claims by the U.S. government that 
the democratic space was narrowing because of stringent new legislation on the media, civil 
society, political parties, and other segments of society. Before and after the 2005 national 
election, U.S. embassy officials also held a series of dialogues with opposition parties on “the 
intimidation and harassment of their supporters and members and [the opposition’s] serious 
concern on the government abuse of human rights.”97 U.S. officials’ common response to the 
opposition parties’ criticism of U.S. wariness to put pressure on the GOE was that “we don’t beat 
drums but we are quietly engaging the government on various human rights concerns the U.S. 
has.”98 
In 2007, Assistant Secretary of State, Barry Lowenkron, also raised concerns about the 
human rights situation, focusing on the release of the jailed opposition leaders.99 The White 
House had accused the GOE of “failing to create an environment conducive to free and fair 
elections” and further invalidated [the 2010 Ethiopian national election] as “fall[ing] short of 
international commitments.”100 State Department Spokesman Philip J. Crowley also tried to send 
a clear and direct message that the GOE should take steps to improve democratic governance and 
institutions.101 In the period following the 2010 election, the National Security Council’s 
spokesman, Mike Hammer, made an official statement about U.S. concerns with regard to the 
restriction of independent observation and the harassment of journalists, and criticized the GOE 
for narrowing the political space for the opposition parties and weakening civil society in 
contravention of the government’s human rights obligations.102 
In addition to dialogue, the U.S. government has provided support for human rights 
projects and capacity building for the Ethiopian government and civil society sector. Under the 
capacity building program, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Agency for International 
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95 Id. 
96 THE GUARDIAN, U.S. Embassy Cables: U.S. Urges Ethiopia to Back Copenhagen Climate Accord, Feb. 2, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/246644/.  
97 Interview with Dr. Yacob Hailemariam, retired Professor of Business Law, Norfolk State University, in Addis 
Ababa (Feb. 21, 2011) (notes in Amharic and on file with author).  
98 THE GUARDIAN, supra note 45; See also Interview with Dr. Yacob Hailemariam, retired Professor of Business 
Law, Norfolk State University, Addis Ababa (Feb. 21, 2011) (notes in Amharic and on file with author), and 
Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor, George Mason University, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Jan. 22, 2011) (on file 
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(Oct. 2, 2007) (statement of Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs). 
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102 Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act, S. 3757, 111th Cong. § 2-12 (2010). 




Development have held various workshops, seminars, and trainings designed to make a 
“constructive intervention” to promote human rights.103 The U.S. Embassy has also actively 
advocated for press freedom, engaging journalists to support media freedom and the freedom of 
speech in Ethiopia.104 
Several additional diplomatic tools—viewed as purely “symbolic”—were also used to 
advance the cause of human rights105 or to show the U.S. government’s disapproval of GOE 
measures. For instance, U.S. officials and the ambassador’s assistants regularly attended the 
trials of opposition leaders, journalists and civil society organization (CSO) leaders.106 President 
Obama’s 2015 trip to Ethiopia and consecutive meeting with high-level civil society 
representatives could also be seen a symbolic diplomatic gesture to show solidarity with the 
human rights organizations and civil society organization that had been severely weakened as a 
result of the restrictive Charities and Societies law.  
This shows how the human rights agenda has been publicly and quietly advanced through 
U.S. diplomacy. One may conclude, however, that the human rights agenda in U.S.-Ethiopia 
relations is generally limited to low-key diplomatic interactions meant to quietly engage GOE 
authorities. In public, the U.S. government conducts capacity-building trainings and issues the 
annual human rights report, only occasionally resorting to more blunt public criticism.  
 
B.   The Ethiopian Government’s Stance on Human Rights in U.S.-Ethiopian Relations 
 
Ethiopia’s stance on human rights pressure exerted through diplomatic channels is best 
summarized by Prime Minister Meles’s speech in Parliament: “[I]t is futile to assume that if we 
do not believe in something as a matter of principle, a donor will force us to do so, it is not in our 
tradition to bow down to pressure.”107 To reaffirm this, the government’s position is clearly 
demonstrated in the prime minister’s speech: 
  
Ethiopia certainly believes it has a lot to learn from the experiences of its partners. 
It doesn’t however want outsiders to entertain the idea that they can play a central role, be 
it political or economic. That will always be an illusion, as the operation of Ethiopia 
foreign policy underlines. On this basis, the Ethiopian government wants to maintain 
relations with countries based on the principles of mutual respect and the promotion of 
mutual interest.108 
 
The GOE maintains that a foreign government should not try to twist its arm by making 
aid conditional. Ultimately, the government has declared that it will not submit to foreign 
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105 Interview by Ambassador Yamamato with Dr. Yacob Hailemariam, Professor of Bus. Law, Norfolk State Univ., 
Addis Ababa, Eth. (Feb. 21, 2011). 
106 Id.; Interview with Sisay Agena, former Editor-in-Chief, Eth. Amharic Weekly Newspaper (Mar. 1, 2011).  
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108 Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy: The Core Aim and 
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pressure out of fear of aid or assistance restrictions.109 The government believed that it should 
strive to reduce dependency on foreign aid in order to ensure its own autonomy.110 
The GOE also believed that protection of human rights and democratization should not 
be imported from abroad through foreign coercion, but rather should emerge through grassroots 
and local initiatives, and that this is a time-consuming process.111 The Ethiopian government has 
a tendency to treat human rights issues and democracy as part of the domestic political domain, 
where foreign interference is not appropriate or acceptable.112 
Policy statements and recent government measures also demonstrate this government’s 
stance. For instance, one Ethiopian foreign policy document113 specifically identified the major 
threat to Ethiopian national security and survival as “economic backwardness, the desperate 
poverty together with the need for democracy, good governance and respect for human 
rights.”114 Ethiopia has also declared that poverty eradication, sustainable development, good 
governance, human rights, and democracy are commitments that Ethiopia shares with the United 
States.115 But at the policy level, the human rights agenda is subordinated to achieving rapid 
economic growth.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clearly stated “[p]arties whose partnership facilitates 
the achievement of rapid economic development are the friends whose relationship has the 
greatest significance for Ethiopia’s viability as a nation.”116 Shinn argues that unlike the previous 
regimes, the EPRDF is interested in maintaining close ties with the United States and other 
superpowers in order to obtain development assistance and economic support and is less 
interested in military aid and assistance to maintain its territorial integrity and security.  
Despite the Ethiopian government’s insistence that it welcomes dialogue and engagement 
based on accurate and objective study,117 the government tends to staunchly defend its position 
concerning its domestic policy on human rights and democratization, reiterating its firm position 
that “Ethiopia is not a country where the government bows to pressures[.]”118 The Ethiopian 
government’s stance regarding the pressure from foreign governments was clearly stated during 
a U.S. diplomats’ meeting with the prime minister in 2010. The prime minister stated, 
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this as a “red line.” Interview with K-2 (Feb. 8, 2011) (on file with author). 
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[A]s evidenced by the statement they issued [diplomatic corps of foreign 
allies] demanding the release of opposition politicians upon their arrest in 2005 
[and also] today . . . foreign embassies are inadvertently conveying the same 
message, that they will protest the jailing of opposition leaders and potentially 
take action against the Ethiopian government to secure their release.119. . . the 
GOE [Ethiopian government] has made clear to both opposition and EPRDF 
leaders that nothing can protect them except the laws and constitution of Ethiopia, 
the GOE will clamp down on anyone who violates those laws.120 
 
Bearing this in mind, the Ethiopian government’s response to the State Department’s human 
rights report will be discussed in the following subsection.  
 
1.   The Ethiopian Government and the State Department’s Annual Human Rights Report 
 
The Ethiopian government views the annual human rights reports as an “inevitable and 
annual irritant in the otherwise excellent relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia.”121 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has entirely dismissed the report as inaccurate and based on 
unfounded allegations aimed at ruining Ethiopia’s image122 because the government believes that 
it adversely affects the country’s reputation and has misled the international community about 
the “truth and objective situation in present day Ethiopia.”123 The GOE’s response states that past 
allegations are “groundless fabrications” intended to “tarnish Ethiopia’s image.”124 According to 
a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government has chosen to ignore all past 
allegations as largely unfounded lies, but has decided to respond to current State Department 
reports in order to set the record straight. The GOE has noted that past allegations have affected 
the national image and has complicated relations with the U.S.,UN bodies and other donors.125 
According to the GOE, one of the most significant flaws in the reports is the nature of the 
sources, as the GOE says most information is derived from open sources with very little “on the 
ground” research to back it up. According to Ethiopia’s Response, the primary sources of 
reported information are opposition groups and websites,126 Gazette reports, NGO reports, and 
personal complaints, both written and oral. He contends that those in the opposition who fail in 
the democratic political competition conspire to bring their cases under the guise of human rights 
abuses.127 In connection with this, the GOE believes that the local NGOs have an “intrinsically 
unhealthy” relationship with the U.S. (and other foreign donors) because NGOs often exaggerate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 U.S. Embassy Cables: U.S. Urges Ethiopia to Back Copenhagen Climate Accord, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2010, 
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120 Id. 
121 Supra note 117 at 2-3. 
122 Id. at 2. 
123 Supra note 118 at 3. 
124 See id. 
125 Confidential Interview with K-2, (Feb. 8, 2011) (on file with author). According to an unanimous informant, the 
human rights reports can be used to substantiate other allegations and to establish a kind of fact to accuse the GOE 
of gross human rights violations setting a very bad human rights record which the government is trying to deal with 
them.  
126 GOV’T COMM. AFF. OFF., supra note 116 at 3.  
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and politicize the human right issues in order to guarantee their survival based on financial 
support they get from the U.S.128 
The GOE also argues that the annual report is generally a direct replica of reports from 
the previous year with minor modifications.129 The government further contends that until 
recently, it had rarely been consulted or asked for explanations about some of the alleged human 
rights violations.130 One MOFA informant said that the drafters of the report do not seem to put a 
lot of effort into it, simply rushing to organize some fabricated and unfounded allegations.131 
The Ethiopian government has also taken the position that human rights should not be 
used as a pretext to advance other economic and political agendas. For example, the 2009 annual 
report mentions restrictions on internet access as a violation of freedom of expression and the 
press.132 The GOE rejected “the criticism leveled under the guise of human rights abuse is 
nothing but blatant political and economic interest.”133 The GOE argues that such allegations are 
made because the government has made a policy decision to retain the telecom service under 
“public ownership” rather than denationalize it.134 On the other hand, the GOE notes “the U.S. 
government uses its annual report to express its support of Ethiopia’s struggle against terrorism, 
unequivocally condemning the terrorist bombers and their dangerous destabilizing activity.”135 
Prime Minister Meles’s statement summarizes the Ethiopian government’s position: 
“There are issues on which the officials in the United States feel strongly and differently, and 
there are issues on which we feel strongly and differently from those of the United States.  We 
will agree to disagree on those we do not agree on, and we agree to work together on issues of 
common interest.”136The common interest between the U.S. and Ethiopia is clearly security and 
regional stability. The Ethiopian government’s policy towards the U.S. also suggests that 
ensuring its diplomatic and political support is of paramount importance to achieve the peace and 
security objectives of the GOE. Accordingly, continuous dialogue and consultation is important 
to bridge differences “in the context of the strategic value of the relationship.”137 According to 
senior officials in the MOFA, even though the GOE has no legal obligation to respond to the 
U.S. human rights report, the Ethiopian government does not want to simply dismiss American 
concerns, because the GOE wants to improve its bilateral relationship with the U.S.138 As a 
result, the GOE has managed to arrange mechanisms of dialogue with the U.S. government on 
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various human rights issues whenever these issues are raised, but the GOE often advises more 
focus in the discussion on common interests and concerns.139 
 
 
2.   Ethiopian Human Rights Measures 
The GOE took both hard and soft measures to enforce its own policies and government 
positions discussed above. These include, for instance, the jamming of the Voice of America 
News (VOA) Amharic program, the charging of two journalists along with opposition leaders 
after the contested 2005 national election, and the CSO legislation enacted in 2009. Currently, as 
a result of the Charities and Societies Proclamation restriction, in Ethiopia, most donors and aid 
agencies are forced to shift into development assistance and non-rights related work.140  
As previously stated, the GOE has often pointed to the unhealthy relationship between 
the NGO sector and foreign donors. In fact, the Ethiopian government believes that NGOs and 
the foreign community are “blindly” supporting the Ethiopian opposition,141 advancing a hidden 
political agenda that lacks genuine concern for human rights and democracy. More importantly, 
the GOE argues that democracy should “develop organically” in Ethiopia;142 it is only Ethiopian 
citizens who should organize and defend their rights, and there should not be a “spoon-fed 
democracy.”143 For these reasons, in part, the GOE enacted legislation to make the sector 
accountable to its own members and constituency, rather than to foreign entities.144 But the other 
equally important rationale behind the Charities and Societies Proclamation is the government 
policy of resisting foreign pressure of any type.145 Thus, the law prevents most foreign-funded 
NGOs from working in the areas of human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution.146 
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145 Critics like Getachew Metafirai also argue that “the lives of CSOs in most cases depend on the funds and the 
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Confidential Interview with K-1, Senior Official, FDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 15, 2011) (on file with 
author), and Confidential Interview with K-2, (Feb. 8, 2011) (on file with author). 
146 It has also been reported that because of the newly enacted CSO law that would eventually close down many 
projects funded by the U.S. government, David Kramer, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human 
Rights, came to Ethiopia to discuss concerns with the GOE. Elizabeth Blunt, Ethiopia Fears Over Aid Clampdown, 
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 GOE claim that VOA’s Amharic programming raises serious concerns for the Ethiopian 
government147 because the GOE believes that “VOA is biased and gives a platform for extremist 
elements.”148 The GOE has accused VOA of seeking “to report only what is anti-government or 
lend support for the opposition,” and therefore lacking neutrality.149 As a result, in 2010 the GOE 
jammed the VOA Amharic program in Ethiopia.150 
 
III.   DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS BILLS IN THE U.S.:151 A LITMUS TEST TO ADVANCE 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY SCHEMES 
 
The U.S. draft legislation HR-2003 is a controversial bill that emerged following 
Ethiopia’s 2005 national election. The debate over HR-2003 demonstrated the complexity of 
using foreign policy as a framework to advance the cause of human rights. The intricate interests 
involved in the foreign policy machinery, competing foreign policy goals, and the limitation of 
possible diplomatic tools to advance human rights can all be clearly illustrated by examining the 
draft bills.152 
HR-2003 was proposed through Congressman Donald Payen with the Ethiopian diaspora 
and human rights advocacy groups lobbying in favor of the bill.153 Post-2005 election violence 
mobilized the Ethiopian diaspora, critics of the Ethiopian government, and human rights 
advocacy groups to reach out to members of Congress and influence the U.S. policy-making 
process on the basis of alleged gross violations of human rights by the GOE.154 The draft 
legislation primarily aimed at “supporting democracy and human rights in Ethiopia,” proposing 
technical and financial assistance as well as threatening to take punitive diplomatic measures that 
would restrict U.S. security assistance to Ethiopia.155 The bill tried to strike a balance between 
the various policy goals. It proposed to support the advancement of human rights and democracy, 
the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, peacekeeping, capacity building and 
economic development, to foster stability and supporting humanitarian assistance, but also to 
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enable collaboration with Ethiopia in the Global War on Terror.156 By drafting it this way, 
proponents intended to make this law serve the human rights agenda as well as maintain other 
equally important security and stability interests. 
Subsequently, a draft bill entitled the “Support for Democracy and Human Rights in 
Ethiopia Act of 2010” was introduced in the Senate by Senators Feingold and Leahy.157 This bill 
proposed punitive measures restricting assistance158 and called for conditionality in the U.S.’s 
assistance to Ethiopia unless the GOE allowed civil society to operate in the area of human 
rights, guaranteed political freedom and released political prisoners, allowed VOA and other 
independent media to operate, and held the security forces accountable for human rights 
violations.159 According to the drafters, these goals were based on the U.S. government’s 
findings about “ongoing and serious human rights abuses against civilians in the Somali Region” 
of Ethiopia.160  
The Ethiopian government’s severe restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, peaceful assembly, and the right to a fair trial were put into place through newly 
enacted legislation in the run-up to the 2010 elections such as the Charities and Societies 
Proclamation and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation.161 This 2010 bill in the U.S. also mentioned 
the detention of opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa and the repeated intimidation of political 
party leaders and their supporters.162 Like the Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 
2007, the 2010 bill also declared U.S. support for the people and government of Ethiopia in the 
effort “to achieve . . . multi-party democracy” and “respect for human rights, and economic 
development,” “to combat extremism and terrorism,” “to promote peace and stability,” to 
provide “humanitarian assistance regardless of gender, ethnicity, or political views,” and to 
ensure transparency and accountability.163 
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The Ethiopian government in both instances criticized the draft bills as interference with 
the sovereignty of the state. The GOE argued that the proposed legislation would “undermine 
regional stability in the Horn of Africa by jeopardi[z]ing vital security cooperation between the 
United States and Ethiopia.”164 When the Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007 
was passed in Congress, Samuel Assefa, Ethiopia’s ambassador to the U.S., called the draft bill 
“irresponsible” and said it would “undermine regional stability.”165 Consequently, the GOE hired 
DLA Piper to block the bill and keep it from becoming law in the U.S. 
In 2007, the government of Ethiopia also hired DLA Piper166 to stop a proposed human 
rights  bill on the Ethiopian government in U.S. Congress. In a memo prepared and disseminated 
by these lobbyists, the Ethiopian government challenged the draft bill, arguing that the security 
and national interests of both countries would be threatened if it became law.167 The memo 
argued that prohibition of security assistance to Ethiopia was against both countries’ interests 
because of the high risk of insecurity and regional instability.168 It also argued that the U.S. was 
obtaining intelligence information and defense cooperation from Ethiopia, which is both “strong 
and the only democratic ally in the region.”169 
Despite Washington’s call for more open elections with independent international 
observers, the GOE reasserted its position that foreign interference is not welcome. This position 
was made manifest in the 2010 Note Verbatim to foreign embassies and diplomats in Addis 
Ababa, which restricted travel outside of the city from May 10 through June. The former 
Ethiopian Prime Minister confirmed that “the foreign ministry (MOFA) talked to those 
embassies and indicated to them that it would not be welcome for them to contravene the 
guidance set by the government with regard to [election] observation by diplomats.”170 As a 
result, U.S. embassy officials and those of other Western governments were barred from travel 
during  elections.171 
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See also Interview with Dr. Getachew Metaferia, Professor of Political Science, Morgan State University (Jan. 9, 
2011- Feb 14, 2011). (DLA Piper is a Washington, D.C.-based lobbying firm that is hired at $50,000 a month to 
block the HR-2003 bill.) According to Dr. Getachew Metaferia, the firm has political heavyweight lobbyists such as 
the former House Majority Leaders Richard Armey, a Republican from Texas, and Richard Gephardt, a Democrat 
from Missouri).  
167 Marina W Guevara, Allegiance Rewarded Ethiopia Reaps U.S. Aid by Enlisting in War on Terror and Hiring 




170 Zenawi, supra note 62. It should also be noted that in the 2005 national election, the GOE unexpectedly expelled 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and IFES, all of whom were 
allowed by the GOE to be part of the multi-donor fund for election support, which was managed by the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) in 2005. According to this U.S. official document, the U.S. government undertook a 
program of support for the national legislative and regional council elections held in May 2005. The program 
included a cooperative Institute (IRI),  IFES to Ethiopia, a contribution to a multi-donor fund for election support 
managed by the UN Development Program (UNDP), and a grant to permit the Carter Center to respond to the 
government’s invitation to observe the elections. United States Department of States, supra note 15. 
171 Meles Zenawi, Meles’s Mind: PM Opines, Plans Post-Election. In the 2010 Note Verbatim, which was 
distributed to all embassies and consular affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that no embassy and 




Strong opposition to the first bill (HR 2003) came not only from the Ethiopian 
government, but also from several key officials in the African Bureau of the State Department 
who believed the bill would interfere with U.S. security interests. In the State Department’s 
foreign office, civil servants seemed more inclined to serve the established interests, and most 
notably, the counterterrorism agenda.172 For instance, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, opposed the bill and expressed her concern that it would constrain U.S. 
government interests in the region.173 In their article “Don’t Turn on Ethiopia,” Vicki 
Huddleston174 and Tibor Nagy175 argued that the bill was against U.S. security interests and 
called Ethiopia “one of our closest allies.”176 They argued, “Congress is poised to fuel the march 
toward war by passing a bill that threatens to cut off technical assistance to Ethiopia, one of our 
closest allies . . . . By singling out Ethiopia for public embarrassment, the bill puts Congress 
unwittingly on the side of Islamic jihadists and insurgents.”177 They also accused the Eritrean 
government and some Middle Eastern countries of financing and training armed insurgents in 
Ogaden.178 
The draft bill also directly contradicted the interests of another important organ in the U.S. 
government: the Pentagon. The Pentagon has a strong interest in boosting the military capacity of 
the Ethiopian government in order to fight terrorism and insurgency in Somalia, but HR-2003 
proposed travel restrictions on any government official involved in human rights abuses and 
restrictions on security assistance.179 Such diplomatic tools may not bring the desired results of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
diplomatic mission should travel outside of Addis Ababa without providing due notice to the government. The Note 
Verbatim further ordered that prior permission should be given to foreign staffs to travel outside of Addis. In this 
regard, the GOE position was reaffirmed in the Prime Minister’s interview with journalists. According to Prime 
Minister Meles, “There were some reports that some embassies were violating this decision by the government. The 
foreign ministry talked to those embassies and indicated to them that it would not be welcome for them to 
contravene the guidance set by the government with regard to observation by diplomats.”). See Embassy of The 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles's Post-Election Press Conference 27th June 2006 
Press Conference, Addis Ababa. 
172 Interview with Dr. Getachew Metaferia, Professor of Political Science, Morgan State University (Jan. 9, 2011- 
Feb. 14, 2011). See also Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State 
University, (Dec. 23, 2010-Jan. 24, 2011). 
173 Janine Zacharia, Letter from Washington: War on terror trumps promoting Ethiopian democracy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/world/americas/16iht-
letter.1.7910126.html?_r=1&sq=Human%20right%20in%20Ethiopia%20and%20the%20war%20on%20terrorism%
20U.S.&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=print.  
174 Served as an ambassador from 2002-2004. 
175 Served from 1999 until 2002. 





179 Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2003, 110th Cong. § 5(2)(A)(ii) (2007). An excerpt of 
section 5 of the 2007 Act is as follows:  
Ensuring Government Support For Human Rights, Democracy, and Economic Development in Ethiopia.  
(a) LIMITATION ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE; TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS —  
(1) LIMITATION ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
(A) In General.  —  Except as provided in subparagraph (B), security assistance shall not be provided to 
Ethiopia until such time as the certification described in paragraph (3) is made in accordance with such 
paragraph. 
(B) EXCEPTION.  — Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to peacekeeping assistance, counter-
terrorism assistance, or international military education and training for civilian personnel under section 
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policy change or reform, but may instead turn out to be counterproductive.180 Some even argue 
that the humanitarian aid the U.S. gives to Ethiopia only has limited leverage as a diplomatic tool 
to put pressure on the GOE. According to a senior Western diplomat, as reported by the BBC, 
because aid is largely humanitarian, the U.S. has “few levers of influence.”181 Humanitarian aid 
should not be used as a political weapon “when millions of people are at risk because of hunger, 
poverty and disease.”182 
In fact, the U.S. has been very wary about enacting such a bill because of the established 
belief among foreign policy makers and in bureaucratic circles that such punitive measures may 
not only have unintended consequences, but may “undermine or destabilize the regime” in 
Ethiopia.183 This is because Ethiopia is often seen “as a rock of stability in an otherwise troubled 
region.”184 Those who support the regime and its policies in the U.S. government raise the issue 
of security cooperation. According to Vestal, “even carefully drafted legislation (which attempts 
to balance U.S. security interests with the human rights and democratic issues) will be difficult to 
pass without strong White House support.”185 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (commonly referred to as ‘Expanded IMET’). Peacekeeping or 
counter-terrorism assistance provided to Ethiopia shall not be used for any other security-related purpose or 
to provide training to security personnel or units against whom there is credible evidence of gross human 
rights abuses or violations.  
(2) TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. — Beginning on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act and until such time as the certification described in paragraph (3) is made in accordance with such 
paragraph, the President shall deny a visa and entry into the United States to —  
(A) any official of the Government of Ethiopia — 
 (i) who has been involved in giving orders to use lethal force against peaceful demonstrators or police 
officers in Ethiopia; or  
(ii) against whom there is credible evidence of gross human rights abuses or violations;  
(B) security personnel of the Government of Ethiopia who were involved in the June or November 2005 
shootings of demonstrators;  
(C) security personnel responsible for murdering Etenesh Yemam; and  
(D) security personnel responsible for murdering prisoners at Kaliti prison in the aftermath of the election 
violence in 2005. 
Id. at § 5.   
180 Interview with Dr. Solomon Mebere and Confidential Interview with K-4 (Sept. 10, 2010) (notes in Amharic and 
on file with author).  
181 Peter Biles, Diplomatic pressure grows on Ethiopia, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4418936.stm 
(last updated Nov. 9, 2005); see also Interview with David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador in Ethiopia from 1996 
until 1999. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, (Dec. 22, 
2010 – Dec. 24, 2010); Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State 
University, (Dec. 23, 2010-Jan. 24, 2011). 
182 Id.  
183 Bronwyn E. Bruton, U.S. Policy Shift Needed in the Horn of Africa, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
http://www.cfr.org/ethiopia/us-policy-shift-needed-horn-africa/p19982# (last updated Aug. 6, 2009). 
184 Id. See also Senior US Senators and Gen Ward recognizes Ethiopia as the main stabilizing force in the Horn 
region, AIGAFORUM, http://www.aigaforum.com/news/Senior_US_Senators_and_Gen_Ward.htm (last updated Mar. 
11. 2010).  
185 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011); see also Terrence Lyons, Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crisis, 107 CURRENT HIST.: 154, 159 
(2008) (Washington’s call for democratization and human rights has been criticized as unpersuasive because of  
U.S. support for the GOE cooperation in the war on terror. U.S. policy makers identify the GOE as a “key strategic 
partner”); Interview with Dr. Okobazgi, Professor in the Political Science Department University of Louisville, in 
Louisville, KY (Dec. 22, 2010-Jan. 24, 2010); Interview with Dr. Getachew Metaferia, Professor of Political 
Science, Morgan State University (Feb. 14, 2011); Interview with Professor Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor, 
George Mason University, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Jan. 21 2011) (on file with author) (all argue in favor of this 




U.S. foreign policy regarding the Horn of Africa has been left to the African Bureau of 
the State Department and to the national security bureaucracy, both of which seem interested in 
routine bureaucratic matters rather than change.186 According to Vestal, State Department 
personnel do not want to “endanger their careers,”187 and Schraeder asserts that foreign service 
officers are typically most concerned with maintaining good relations with their “African clients” 
and may fear antagonizing them by raising the issues of political reform and aid 
conditionality.188 Human rights concerns often complicate good relations and have the potential 
to create irritation.189 This is a clear indication that unless a high-level intervention is made, 
foreign policy staff in the State Department’s African Bureau will not have an incentive to act in 
favor of human rights by taking measures against the government.190 
Terrence Lyons argues, therefore, that the legislation is “more symbolic than 
substantive,” with only a slight nuisance effect on the Ethiopian government and the officials of 
the Department of State.191 Although the 2003 bill had White House support, the State 
Department and the Pentagon opposed it, and the President may have ultimately vetoed it for 
national security reasons.192 Extreme measures such as economic sanctions have never been 
seriously considered in the case of Ethiopia under the EPRDF. Restriction and suspension of aid 
are considered to be too punitive and perhaps contrary to U.S. interests. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
idea). 
186 PERTER J. SCHRAEDER, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: INCREMENTALISM, CRISIS AND 
CHANGE 182 (Steve Smith et. al eds., 1994). 
187 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011); Interview with Terrence Lyons Associate Professor, George Mason University, in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia (Jan. 21, 2011) (on file with author).  
188 Schraeder, supra note 181, at 257.  
189 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011); Interview with Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor, George Mason University, in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia (Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with author). 
190 Schraeder, supra note 183. Critics argue that foreign policy bureaucracies of the State Department are career 
officers who do not have any “incentive or penalty” to actively advance the cause of human rights in U.S. 
diplomacy. African Bureau of the State Department for instance has been criticized as “reluctant in pursuing an 
active human rights agenda because foreign service officers usually preoccupied with protecting the already 
established good working relations and sometimes representing the interests of the host states in the U.S. 
government- which often referred by critics as “clientism.” See CLAIR APODACA, UNDERSTANDING U.S. HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLICY: A PARADOXICAL LEGACY 64-65 (2006); Schraeder, supra note 181, at 181-182. But this whole 
argument is highly refuted by Okobazgi as an “apologia” concealing the reality of the U.S. foreign policy towards 
Africa and Ethiopia in particular. The lack of high-level attention in U.S. foreign policy to the African foreign policy 
bureaucracy is because of the very fact that Africa (particularly Ethiopia) does not have sufficient influence to attract 
high-level U.S. foreign policy priority. This is because we do not have domestic American constituency strong 
enough to influence both  formulation and  implementation of American foreign policy towards the continent. Also, 
Ethiopia (and Africa in general) individually lacks leverage critical to playing hardball with the United States in 
ways that would actually grab American attention. Ethiopia and other African countries remain less important to 
American policy-makers in relation to other strategically hot-spot places, such as Egypt, Israel, Turkey, or 
Indonesia. And the Human rights agenda is not an end by itself, but a means to achieve various strategic interests of 
the U.S. See Interview with Dr. Okobazgi, Professor in the Political Science Department University of Louisville, in 
Louisville, KY (Dec. 22, 2010-Jan. 24, 2010). 
191 Lyons, supra note 21, at 160.  
192 Interview with Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor, George Mason University, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Jan. 
22, 2011) (on file with author). Lyons, Shinn, and Metafaria all argued that the executive has never seriously 
targeted Ethiopia for aid cut or sanction based on human rights agenda. Interview with Dr. Getachew Metaferia, 
Professor of Political Science, Morgan State University (Jan. 9, 2011-Feb. 14, 2011).  
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Therefore, the proposed bills, above all, project the intricate interests, the various political 
considerations, the different interest groups within the U.S. government, and the challenges of 
using U.S. foreign policy schemes to advance the cause of human rights in Ethiopia. They also 
show that U.S. foreign policy declarations or expressions of concern over human rights 
violations do not equate to the actual implementation of such standards through foreign policy 
machinery. The U.S. has rhetorically declared its commitment to human rights, but any 
implementation has been subject to various political considerations, negotiations, maneuvering 
and re-prioritization, one after the other.  
 
IV.   APPRAISING U.S.-ETHIOPIAN DIPLOMACY’S SUCCESS IN ADVANCING THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 
 
The discussion in the previous sections provides evidence of the existence of human 
rights issues as a discernible element of U.S. foreign policy in Ethiopia. Despite the many 
parallel objectives of U.S. foreign policy, human rights are considered one goal and a permanent 
element of the diplomatic undertaking. Indeed, foreign policy machinery is often employed to 
advance various goals that may be competing. The U.S. has consistently declared foreign policy 
as a vehicle to advance the cause of human rights,193 but varying degrees of attention and levels 
of importance are assigned to this issue at the policy level as well as in actual implementation.  
In relation to this, it is also imperative to take into consideration the factors that influence 
and shape the choice of diplomatic tools. The U.S. diplomatic investment in the advancement of 
human rights is subject to cost-benefit analysis, taking into account the overall strategic foreign 
policy, the nature of the relationship, the level of alleged human rights abuse, the predominant 
interest of the U.S. at a particular time and other factors. All of these factors determine the role 
of U.S. foreign policy as a framework to advance human rights in Ethiopia. 
A. The predominance of security and stability interests is important in determining the 
place given to human rights. The U.S. interest during the early period of the EPRDF was to 
maintain peace and stability in Ethiopia and the region. The threat of Islamic fundamentalism as 
well as the war on terror emerged as important issues. The U.S. is consistently trying to balance 
its interest in regional stability and Ethiopia’s role in this regard with its concerns over improved 
human rights in Ethiopia.194 In this regard, the Ethiopian government has a strong reputation and 
credibility in the eyes of the West as a dependable ally.195 The GOE has used its significant 
political leverage on a number of important occasions, demonstrating the country’s 
indispensability for regional peace and security issues. Ethiopia played a vital role in brokering 
peace between Juba and Khartoum, contributed their military to the joint United Nations–African 
Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and in 2011, Ethiopian forces were deployed under UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. 
Record 2005 – 2006 4-5(2006). 
194 David Shin, Walking the Line: U.S. Security Policy in East Africa and the Horn, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Feb. 
20, 2013), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12722/walking-the-line-u-s-security-policy-in-east-africa-
and-the-horn; See also Interview with David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador in Ethiopia from 1996 until 1999. He is 
currently an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, (Dec. 22, 2010–Dec. 24, 
2010)   
195 Europeans Tracks U.S. on East Africa, but Remain Reluctant to Sanction Eritrea, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/somalia-wikileaks/8302251/EUROPEANS-TRACK-U.S.-ON-
EAST-AFRICA-BUT-REMAIN-RELUCTANT-TO-SANCTION-ERITREA.html#mainsections [hereinafter 
Europeans Tracks U.S., The Telegraph]. 




Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). As a result, the U.S. has constantly attempted to 
balance its political interests in Ethiopia and is reluctant to press hard on human rights issues. 
U.S. policy makers do not want to antagonize the GOE and potentially lose an ally in the 
region.196  
B. U.S. foreign policy schemes are not solely used to advance the cause of human rights 
but have other competing foreign policy goals that the U.S. wants to achieve. Human rights goals 
by their very nature are “universal aspirations.”197 In the case of U.S.-Ethiopia relations, respect 
for human rights is not a foreign policy goal that is pursued irrespective of other competing 
interests. HR-2003 revealed the policy dilemma between security interests and the human rights 
agenda, and demonstrated that the former prevails. Human rights is not an independent variable 
in U.S. diplomacy towards Ethiopia, but rather subordinate to security objectives and other 
strategic goals of the U.S. 
C. The strength of the relationship the U.S. has with the Ethiopia government is also an 
important consideration. Because the U.S. has good relations with the EPRDF, it is much more 
difficult to be critical about the regime’s human rights record or to engage in a tougher 
diplomatic undertaking. As a result, the human rights agenda is given much prominence during 
election season, usually focusing on civil and political rights. The human rights agenda is 
sometimes a public diplomacy tool used to portray the U.S. as on the side of Ethiopians who 
aspire for freedom and liberty. U.S. policymakers do express concerns about the state of human 
rights in Ethiopia from time to time, and the emphasis of those concerns has varied based on the 
degree to which the government in power and the opposition forces confront each other (which is 
often during and after elections).  
Tough diplomatic measures could undermine the overall strategic goals of the U.S., 
antagonizing a friendly regime and an ally in the region. In the final analysis, U.S. interest is 
with the political force that is going to form a government in Ethiopia.198 Under these 
circumstances, the U.S. is bound to have to walk a tightrope by not antagonizing that government 
while at the same time appearing to support the promotion of human rights in Ethiopia. 
According to Shinn, it would have been much simpler for the U.S. government to use 
human rights abuses against the former military regime.199 This ultimately shows that “human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Interview with Dr. Okobazgi, Professor in the Political Science Department University of Louisville, (Dec. 22, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2010) (“[T]he major concern for American policy-makers is that they would not want to antagonize 
the GOE and lose its participation in the coalition of the willing.”);  Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor 
Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 2010-Jan. 24, 2011). 
197 Kraxberger, supra note 30, at 49. (“Human rights are aspired globally as a universal agenda but other goals in 
foreign policy like security interest are place-dependent, trade, counterterrorism . . . and the like are “place 
dependent and specific to a given geographic space” demanding for special dealing in the diplomacy that is closely 
linked with national self interest.) See also JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY 9 (2d ed. 2008).  
198 The U.S. always intends to ally or maintain good relations with the government that is in power.In the post 2005 
national election, U.S. “policy makers [were] not confident about the ability of the opposition to mount a decisive 
counter-offensive against the regime in power.” As a result, pushing the GOE on human rights and actively 
advocating for respect for human rights by the Ethiopian government might turn out to be an important factor to 
constrain relations between the two counties. Interview with Dr. Okobazigi, (Jan. 3, 2011); see Interview with Dr. 
Getachew Metaferia, Professor of Political Science, Morgan State University, 1/9/2011-2/14/2011; Interview with 
Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor, George Mason University, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Jan. 22, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
199 Interview with David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador in Ethiopia from 1996 until 1999. He is currently an 
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, (Dec. 22, 2010 – Dec. 24, 2010). 
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rights abuse” can be easily tagged to a state that is “unfriendly” or inimical to the U.S. Human 
rights violations, and a state can be manipulated as a political tool to demonize a regime that is 
perceived as unfriendly to U.S. interests. Therefore, one may infer that the human rights agenda 
is conflated with U.S. self-interests and the degree of relationship it has with another 
government. More than anything, this proves that the human rights agenda is not an issue that is 
dispassionately and indiscriminately applied; rather it is used as a political tool to advance U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. 
 D. The level of alleged human rights abuses can also be a factor that influences U.S. 
diplomatic investment with regard to actively advancing the human rights agenda in Ethiopia. If 
violations of human rights reach a level that threatens peace and security in the region, the 
political cost of ignoring it or keeping quiet might be greater than the benefits the U.S. gets from 
the relationship. In this context, the U.S. might have an incentive to gear foreign policy 
machinery to react to human rights violations.200 
This seems possible only if a high-level intervention is led by the President. The “State 
Department and the Department of Defense (“DOD”) seem to oppose any change in policy 
towards Ethiopia” and favor maintaining good relations.201 The African Bureau of the State 
Department and the DOD are much more inclined to serve the U.S. interest in fighting terrorism 
and stabilizing the region.202 
The Africa Bureau of the State Department and the DOD raised serious objections to the 
draft bills proposed by Congress. In more extreme cases, the African bureaucracy of the U.S. 
government was tied up with its own parochial interests and sidelined human rights issues.203 For 
instance, the DOD is said to have been working to boost the military and security capabilities of 
Horn of Africa countries, and particularly Ethiopia, to fight terrorism. The DRL bureau of the 
State Department is mandated to put human rights at the forefront, but has been said to have 
strained relations with the rest of the State Department despite a strong base in Congress and 
among human rights advocacy groups in the U.S. The White House has not taken the lead role in 
dictating U.S. foreign policy to advance human rights issues in Ethiopia. All of this combined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 A clear instance of such incidence is the recent development in Egypt that the National Democratic Party and the 
Hussein Mubarak leadership was a strategic ally to the U.S. But his friendship proved to be a political liability that 
popular outrage and risk of instability was at stake and the U.S. had to support the democratic movement in Egypt. 
In such instance the U.S. mobilized the foreign policy machinery to act in favor of the “Revolution”/ popular 
movement to advance the cause of human rights and democratic values.  
201 Interview with Theodore Vestal, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, (Dec. 23, 
2010-Jan. 24, 2011);  Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor, George Mason University, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
(Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with author), and Interview with David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador in Ethiopia from 
1996 until 1999. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, (Dec. 
22, 2010 – Dec. 24, 2010). See also Ethiopia and the State of Democracy: Effects on Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Conditions in the Ogaden and Somalia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/10/01/ethiopia-and-state-democracy-effects-human-rights-and-humanitarian-
conditions-ogaden.  
202 Theodore Vestal and Shinn also agrees with the argument that especially after 9/11 the Pentagon have been said 
to have taken the lead role in dictating and executing U.S. relations with Ethiopia which is oftentimes accused of 
trying to maintain the status quo and keeping the good relations with African governments and downplaying human 
rights issues. Interview with Theodore Vestal Jan. 25, 2011; Interview with Shinn. 
203 Schraeder, supra note 181, at 182. (As Peter J. Schrader rightly pointed out “White house has increasingly 
deferred to the African specialists within the state department, the pentagon and the CIA…. As a result the 
bureaucratic interpretation of national interest as perceived through the parochial filters of bureaucratic missions will 
serve the primary guides for the evaluation of the US Africa policies.”). 




with the increasing strategic importance of Ethiopia, makes the human rights agenda a secondary 
issue. 
E. The other important factor that determines which diplomatic tools the U.S. employs to 
advance human rights goals is Ethiopian government policy and reaction to criticism advanced 
in foreign policy machinery. The GOE has tried to assert its position that economic development 
and stability are the long-term strategy; this is what the government gives precedence to and 
wants to achieve.204 Significant developments in GOE policy suggest that diplomatic tools 
should be geared towards support for economic development, with the clear message that foreign 
diplomacy that supports the economic development of the country is given priority. 
The Ethiopian government invokes sovereignty, independence and mutual respect in any 
diplomatic undertaking. The GOE believes that the human rights agenda as it is being advanced 
through U.S. diplomacy via the annual report is not based on accurate evidence. As a result, the 
government responds to “put the record straight” and takes measures to assert its independent 
position concerning domestic policies. These measures are a clear reflection of the government’s 
policy of asserting autonomy and resisting perceived and actual foreign interference. 
The reason for GOE resistance and rejection of some of the human rights issues advanced 
through diplomatic machinery is also due in part to suspicion. The GOE is skeptical about the 
human rights agenda being pursued as a foreign policy tool. The GOE’s skepticism also 
emanates from diminished U.S. credibility as a legitimate voice to advance the cause of human 
rights following the U.S.’s actions after 9/11.205 The Ethiopian government’s official response to 
the human rights report of 2010 points out “Guantánamo prison” as an example of U.S. human 
rights violations. 
These and other similar measures have narrowed or closed the avenues for diplomatic 
undertakings on human rights. Measures such as the promulgation of the Proclamation to 
Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies, which limits foreign 
funding and NGO activities, marked a buffer zone to avoid foreign pressure and put a roadblock 
up to stop any potential pressure coming from foreign sources. As the Council of Foreign 
Relations report states, the Ethiopian government’s tactics isolate international organizations and 
many local NGOs.206 
For all of these reasons, the U.S. diplomatic machinery used to advance the human rights 
agenda in Ethiopia is overwhelmingly complicated. The factors range from the nature of human 
rights violations to the practical constraints at the policy and implementation levels.  
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
Human rights have become an international concern and a major topic in international 
law and politics. As part of this international wave, especially since the Carter period, a great 
deal of remarkable work has been done to institutionalize foreign policy machinery as a 
framework to advance human rights. Despite clearly stating this foreign policy objective, the 
U.S. faces several challenges and limitations in its efforts to use the diplomatic machinery to 
advance the cause of human rights in Ethiopia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Europeans Tracks U.S., The Telegraph, supra note 193.  
205 Emeritus, supra note 191, at 246.  
206 Bruton, supra note 181, at 8-9.   
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In the post-1991 period, this use of foreign policy has faced challenges embedded in the 
way human rights is defined and advanced, and in the intricate vested interests involved, 
especially among U.S. foreign policy bureaucrats. The effort to advance human rights through 
diplomatic channels has been in constant negotiation and compromise with security and political 
interests. In effect, human rights have remained a subordinate and marginal agenda. Since the 
human rights agenda is a marginal concern, the role of foreign policy as an effective tool to 
advance this cause is challenging and problematic. Even in limited diplomatic engagements, the 
human rights agenda has been selectively advanced, mainly with regard to the protection of civil 
and political rights, and with quiet diplomatic tools and approaches employed. 
The Ethiopian political context must also be taken into account when examining the role 
of foreign policy as a framework for advancing the cause of human rights in that country. 
Diplomatic tools are not employed in a political vacuum; rather, the political context of Ethiopia 
and the GOE both play a significant role in determining the force and viability of the pressure. It 
is not only U.S. interests and the foreign policy bureaucracy that determine the way foreign 
policy machinery is engaged and the diplomatic tools used to advance human rights. The 
political setting in Ethiopia is equally important in this regard. Indeed, the political setting in the 
U.S.-Ethiopian context abounds with diverse interests and competing foreign policy goals, 
requiring the balancing of political forces. The U.S. has vital security and political interests in 
Ethiopia and wants to maintain the ‘political goodwill’ of the Ethiopian government. 
In this regard, the U.S.’s strategic policy of advancing human rights using low-key 
diplomatic tools both maintains and ultimately serves U.S. interests. The foreign policy 
machinery is mobilized to gauge the degree of relations, the balance of forces between the GOE 
and its opposition [and less significantly, the civil society sector]. Since human rights are not an 
end in and of itself in U.S. foreign policy, the use of foreign policy machinery to advance the 
cause is calculated in terms of overall strategic foreign policy objectives. 
The U.S.’s cautious approach to advancing the cause of human rights in Ethiopia seems 
clearly related to the GOE’s policy of tough resistance and rejection. As a result of the Ethiopian 
government’s harsh measures, important venues for human rights dialogue, information 
dissemination and mobilization have been significantly reduced. Therefore, despite its potential 
capability to internationalize the human rights agenda, the foreign policy machinery has been 
politicized and obscured by various national interest claims, sovereignty assertions, security and 
political interests. Despite its attractiveness, the foreign policy framework tends to politicize 
human rights violations in ways that challenge its effectiveness and fail to meet the need for a 
more sober discussion and engagement. 
The lack of principled engagement and inconsistency of the U.S diplomatic approach to 
advance the cause of human rights has undermined the potential success of human rights 
diplomacy in Ethiopia. Advancing human rights issues in a bilateral relationship is a very 
difficult balancing act that is often times misused, misrepresented, and manipulated to serve a 
narrow political interest. This illustrates that the bilateral diplomatic scheme has an intrinsic 
challenge and is not adequate as an effective means for advancing the cause of human rights.  
 
 
 
